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In November 1995, the National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops unanimously approved the Ethical and Religious Directives 
(hereinafter, ERD) .1 While most recent attention has centered on the 
"Appendix" where the principle of cooperation is outlined, that 
seventeenth·century principle is hardly innovative. Rather, there are 
five places within the directives that any reader would find new. 
First, Kevin Wildes, in the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 
argues that the only innovation in the ERD is that the ecclesiology is 
from the top down.2 [n these Directives, the local bishop is certainly 
more evident than any earlier Directives: the bishops assume a highly 
visible place in the ERD. For instance, in the "General Introduction," 
the bishop is seen in his office as exercising a classic, three-fold role as 
pastor, teacher and priest. These three roles in tum lead to three 
responsibilities that bishops have in health care ministry . 
As the center of un ity in the diocese and coordinator of ministries 
in the local Church, the diocesan bishop fosters the mission of 
Catho lic health care in a way that promotes collaboration among 
health care leaders. providers. medica l profess ionals, 
theologians, and other specialislS. As pastor. the diocesan bishop 
is in a unique position to encourage the faithful to greater 
responsibility in (he healing ministry in whatever sening it is 
carried out in the diocese. As priest. the diocesan bishop 
oversees the sacramental care of the sick. 
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Concretely these responsibilities mean. for instance. that the bishop is 
consulted for the appointment of the pastoral care director (ERD, 21); 
if the director is not Catholic, the bishop's approval is needed (ERD, 
22). Likewise the bishop appoints any priests or deacons to the pastoral 
care staff (ERD, 2 1). Wildes is right to recognize the role given to the 
bishops. That role was established because the bishops understood 
themselves as the final guarantors of the Catholic identity, mission and 
values of the health care facilities in their own diocese. 
Though the bishops understand themselves as final guarantors 
of the hea1th care facilities ' Catholic identity, mission and values they 
hardly consider themselves the first guarantors. In the "General 
Introduction," they recognize that most Catholic health care facilities 
have been founded by religious women who sought to continue the 
mission of Jesus in healing and caring for those who are sick. 
Likewise, they recognize how those religious women and men are now 
involved in collaborative ministries with lay persons. 
Moreover, the bishops also do not consider themselves the more 
immediate guarantors of the health care facilities' Catholic identity, 
mission and values. This can be seen, for instance, by comparing 
earlier drafts on hospital ethics committees with the final , approved 
text. Earlier, the bishops considered appointing hospital ethics 
committees or, at least, the committee' s ethicists. Instead, after 
describing the work of these committees in advising and reviewing 
hospital policies and procedures, they added "there should be 
appropriate standards for medical ethical consultation within a 
particular diocese that will respect the diocesan bishop's pastoral 
responsibility as well as assist members of ethics committees to be 
familiar with Catholic medical ethics and, in particular, those 
directives." (ERD, 37) Here we see the health care faci lity then serving 
as the responsible agent in carrying out the directives. Those within the 
faci li ty "must respect and uphold the religious mission of the institution 
and uphold these directives." (ERD, 9). In fact, the entire first part 
assumes and underlines that the ones most immediately and directly 
responsible for shaping, protecting and promoting the Catholic identity, 
mission and values of the facility are those working within the facility, 
not the chancery! (ERD, 1-9) 
Thus, Wildes is right to note the particular role of bishops, but 
Wildes misses the real concern: that is, in an age of pluralism and 
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increasing diversity, the importance of guaranteeing Catholic identity, 
mission and values. Though the bishops wrote, approved and 
promulgated ERD, they clearly recognized that they were not the 
singular guarantors of the Catholic presence in health care. Rather they 
saw themselves with others who have continuously exercised their own 
leadership as founders and guarantors of that ministry. Throughout the 
document, then, we find a call for those working within both health 
care facilities and chanceries to be in dialogue with one another and 
sensitive to the respective competencies of each other. Again, we find 
in the "General Introduction," "The responsibilities will require that 
Catholic health care providers and the diocesan bishop engage in on-
going communication on ethical and pastoral matters that require his 
attention." 
Thus we need to see that while the role of the bishop is 
vigorously present in the Directives that role is a very specific one 
among others. For this reason, anyone reading part six, "Fonning New 
Partnerships with Health Care Organizations and Providers," will 
recognize that while the role of the bishop is clearly apparent, his final 
authority does not compromise the first and more immediate 
competency of those in the facility. The call to the bishop to be 
attentive to his responsibility to promote and protect the facilities' 
Catholic identity, mission, and values is at once a call to the facilities ' 
own administrators and employees to no less guarantee that ministry. 
This insight leads then into an appreciation of the second 
innovation which John Gallagher describes in a wonderful essay in 
Review for Rehgious.) There he comments on the five narrative 
sections of ERD. While these narrative sections are certainly a major 
innovation, Gallagher recognizes that they are not simply stylistic 
changes. Rather he comments on the ecclesiology that is provided in 
these sections. He contends that there is a considerable shift from 
earlier ideas of the Church that described priests and religious working 
the Church's ministry while lay people worked in the world's political 
work. This dichotomy is overcome in the directives where lay ministry 
is integrated into the Church ' s mission.4 Rightly, Gallagher insists that 
this extension of the laity into ministry is not "regrettable" or some 
" last resort" measure, but rather an attempt to follow the Spirit: the 
shared ministry is not a pragmatic patchwork, but a vision of the 
Church's proper ministries. Thus, he suggests that thi s more inclusive 
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ecclesiology ought to guide those sharing in this ministry to develop a 
new self-understanding of their own roles as "Heralds of the Gospel."s 
Gallagher provides, then, a healthy and insightful corrective to 
Wildes' complaint: the protection and promotion of Catholic identity, 
mission and values in the health care arena is a task for all who share 
in the labor of Catholic health care facilities. Finally, the Catholic 
Health Care Association developed this insight with extraordinary 
vision in their 1996 Annual Conference entitled, «Enacting the New 
Covenant." 
Third, Gallagher also notes a nod to the common good in ERD 
insofar as certain directives (56 and 57) say that excessive expenses to 
the family or the community could make a proportionate burden a 
disproportionate one. While this is an astute observation, Gallagher's 
recognition needs to be tempered by certain other concerns that the 
National Conference of Catholic Bishops recognized. Notably, in order 
to protect patients, ERD anticipated the attempts of certain managed 
care insurers who would tty to deny payments to a patient precisely by 
invoking these directives. Thus, these same directives (56 and 57) as 
well as an earlier one (32) insist that the arbiter who determines a 
disproportionate mean is the patient alone. No one else can make this 
election. Thus, if the patient considers the services being delivered to 
her as unreasonably expensive for her family or her community, then 
she alone may reasonably opt to consider the means as 
di sproportionate. The innovation then is not simply a nod to the 
common good. Rather it is an attempt to achieve a prudential balance: 
in the era of HMOs, ERD does not shrink from upholding concern for 
the common good as part of the calculus of extraordinary versus 
ordinary care, but it also does not fail to protect the patient's own health 
care and own obligation to make right moral decisions in conscience. 
Fourth, this leads to what I consider the most important shift in 
the revised directives: this is a remarkable change from a best interest 
model of decision making to the responsible patient wishes model. The 
fonner model is based on the premise that only those who are medically 
competent determine a patient 's course of treatment. This model 
predominated in much of Catholic medical ethics. It meant basically 
that a physician (and sometimes a priest or ethicist) determined what 
constituted extraordinary or ordinary carc. 
In ERD, the patient and not the health care provider is the 
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primary decision maker. Three steps are taken to insure a responsible 
patient wishes model. First, ERD stipulates repeatedly in directives 24 
and 28 (and implicitly in 25 and 59) that no Catholic Health Care 
facility is obliged to provide to any patient services that conflict with 
ERD or Catholic moral principles. These prohibitions, however, are 
fewer than we realize, e.g., abortion, sterilizations, assisted suicide, 
certain reproductive technologies. If the prohibited are few and 
specific, then the parameters of the permitted are considerably broad. 
Thus, second, within the context of the permitted, the patient singularly 
decides about her care. This is reiterated repeatedly (ERD, 25, 26, 27, 
28,32, 56, 59). Thus, it is the patient who determines what constitutes 
extraordinary means. We read, "While every person is obliged to use 
ordinary means to preserve his or her health, no person should be 
obliged to submit to a health care procedure that the person has judged. 
with a free and informed conscience, not to provide a reasonable hope 
of benefit without imposing excessive risks and burdens on the patient 
or excessive risks and burdens on the patient or excessive expense to 
family or community." (ERO, 25) 
Moreover, ERD explicitly imposes on designated surrogates the 
primary responsibili ty of representing the patient ' s wishes and not to 
make "best interest" decisions. Thus, if a physician, nurse, priest or 
ethicist advise a surrogate that a particular course of treatment is from 
their point of view preferable, the surrogate must in conscience adhere 
to the patient's wishes, provided that they do not conflict with ERD or 
any other Catholic moral teaching. The surrogate can only tum to the 
claims or best interest when there is no evidence of the patient's own 
wishes (ERD, 25). 
Furthermore, ERD upholds this shift even in the event that a 
surrogate has not been appointed and no advanced directive is 
available6, then "those who are in a posit ion to know best the patient' s 
wishes - usually family members and loved ones - should participate in 
the treatment decisions for the person who has lost the capacity to make 
health care decisions." (ERO, 25). 
Finally, this shift is based on the premise that the patient ' s 
decision-making is not an action based on a freedom from the truth, but 
on an obligation to pursue the true:? the patient is not free in 
conscience to pursue whatever she wishes, rather she is required to 
make a responsible decision. Therefore, the health care professionals 
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are required to inform her properly to accomplish this task: "'Free and 
informed consent requires that the person or the person's surrogate 
receive all reasonable information about the essential nature of the 
proposed treatment and its benefits; its risks, side-effects, 
consequences, and cost; and any reasonable and morally legitimate 
alternatives, including no treatment at all." (ERD, 27). 
Readers of ERD should see that the assertion of an individual 
as the proper decision-maker is not rooted in the ubiquitous American 
principle of autonomy. That principle argues that the agent should be 
free from all sorts of encroachments. Rather, Catholic teaching is 
rooted in the dignity of the human person. From that dignity, a person 
is obliged in conscience to determine what God wants from her. The 
primacy of our obligation to conscience drives this turn to patient 
wishes. "The inherent dignity of the human person must be respected 
and protected regardless of the nature of the person's health problem or 
social status. The respect for human dignity extends to all persons who 
are served by Catholic health care." (ERD, 23). 
ERD's final innovation is the actual crafting of the particular 
directives. Recognizing that the articulation of moral judgments is an 
on-going process of trying to determine the truth as we come to 
understand more clearly the complexities that lie before us,s ERD often 
set the parameters for right action, rather than actually determining 
specific procedures. One such instance is the question of whether 
artificial hydration and nutrition for patients in persistent vegetative 
constitutes extraordinary versus ordinary means. Rather than "settling" 
this question, we find ERD, in the narrative of part five, "Issues in Care 
for the Dying," presenting on the one side the wrongness of euthanasia 
and on the other side instances when such means are clearly 
extraordinary. Then, turning specifica1ly to the question, ERD reminds 
the reader of the distinction between those "questions already resolved 
by the magisterium and those requiring further reflection." While 
stating the "presumption" to provide such means, ERD clearly 
recognizes that this is not an absolute requirement (ERD, 58). 
ERD also faced the question of ending the life-threatening 
ectopic pregnancy. Not wanting to persist in invoking the principle of 
double effect which led to an unnecessaty tuballigation,9 ERD simply 
wrote, "In case of extrauterine pregnancy, no intervention is morally 
licit which constitutes a direct abortion." (ERD, 48). Undoubtedly, 
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Catholic moralists will try now to find a proper way of responding to 
an extrauterine pregnancy that on the one hand does not constitute a 
direct abortion and on the other hand avoids hanning the woman' s 
body.IO 
This method of "outlining" detenninations. by stipulating the 
boundaries of what is prohibited, but encouraging health care facilities 
and ethicists to find proper resolutions congruent with Church teaching 
can be found throughout the document. In particular, it is evident in the 
rape protocol (ERD, 36), prenatal diagnoses (ERD, 50), and medical 
research on children (ERD, 51). But also it governs the entire section 
on dying as well as the entire section on cooperation. ERD requires 
then an attentive eye and a willingness to pursue right courses of action 
responsibly within licit ambits. It is a document for the times we live 
m. 
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